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Fast Patrol Boats (FPBs) were 
considered a negligible threat when 
the U.S. Navy focused on blue 
water operations far from shore. 
They may pose a much greater 
threat now that the Navy's focus is 
in the littoral. Moreover, the threat 
may be greatly enhanced if the 
FPBs are able to employ 
Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) 
Command and Control C2 
equipment to coordinate their 
efforts. 
This paper presents the design 
and results of a wargaming 
experiment conducted at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) to 
examine this issue. 
The research question is how 
U.S. Navy Surface Action Groups 
(SAGs) operating in littoral waters 
would perform against FPBs 
equipped with COTS C2 equipment 
which would permit them to conduct 
coordinated saturation attacks. The 
experiment also looked at two other 
factors: SAG workload, which 
might exacerbate the effects of the 
FPB 's C2; and the quality of 
intelligence our SAGs are provided 
which might help solve this 
increasing FPB threat. 
A two-cubed factorial experiment 
was conducted to collect data on ten 
performance measures (PMs) for 
each of the 128 trials. Significant 
results were obtained for each of 
the three factors and three 
interactions over a broad range of 
PMs. These results are explained in 
operational terms. 
1 Introduction 
The details and results of a wargaming experiment 
conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
during Winter 1996 are presented. The premise of 
the experiment is that the performance of a U. S . 
Navy Surface Action Group (SAG) conducting 
littoral warfare against fast patrol boats could be 
significantly affected if the enemy uses Commercial 
Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Command and Control 
(C2) equipment, similar to that used by the U.S. 
Navy to achieve the integrated C2 envisioned in 
C4I for the Warrior (C4IFTW). 
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Two other effects were also considered: 
the workload experienced by the SAG and the 
amount of intelligence that the SAG has available 
before hostilities commence. 
A two-cubed factorial experiment was 
conducted to test three main hypotheses: 
Hol: Use of coordinated or uncoordinated 
tactics by red fast patrol boats makes no 
difference in blue SAG performance. 
Ho2: Low or high SAG workload makes no 
difference in blue SAG performance. 
Ho3: Area or Sector specific intelligence 
provided to the SAG makes no difference in 
blue SAG perfonnance. 
Four secondary hypotheses were also 
tested for interactions 
A Persian Gulf scenario was developed as 
the context for the experiment. Eight vignettes 
were developed, each representing a unique 
combination of the factor levels. Common to all 
vignettes are the blue and red Orders of Battle 
(OOBs). 
Each of the 128 trials was scheduled for 38 
minutes of real time play. The game was played at 
four times real time to keep players occupied and to 
increase sample size within the overall time 
constraints. 
B&R was used to implement the scenario 
and to serve as the stimulus for the subjects. Each 
subject controlled the blue side (SAG ships and 
helicopters). A B&R script and automated force 
routines controlled the remaining forces (red/hostile 
and white/neutral sides). 
Sixteen officer students from NPS were 
used as subjects for the experiment. They 
represented all four services and had diverse 
backgrounds within each service as well 
Ten performance measures automatically 
generated by B&R are used to test the hypotheses. 
The data analysis plan includes use of frequency 
plots, box plots, MANOV A, univariate ANOV A, 
interaction plots, residual plots, and non-parametric 
statistics to assess the data. A significance level of 
a == 0.05 was established to test all null 
hypotheses. 
Hypotheses tests show significant results in 
the main hypotheses and several interaction 
hypotheses over a broad range of performance 
measures. 
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2 Purpose - To Examine a Real World 
Problem 
The U.S. Navy's missions are changing from blue 
water strategies that necessitated sophisticated and 
expensive multi-purpose combatants operating in 
carrier battle groups (CVBGs) toward missions 
requiring new regional and littoral strategies that 
frequently employ small groups of ships called 
Surface Action Groups (SAGs) to respond to these 
missions [Hughes, 1986] 
The Fast Patrol Boat (FPB) has always 
been a cost effective platform for littoral warfare, 
especially for third world nations. In the past, 
potentially hostile FPBs have been viewed by the 
U.S. Navy as more of a nuisance factor that 
stresses C2 than a significant threat to the CVBG 
or SAG operations which conduct many missions 
without support of a CVBG' s air wing. This is 
due in part to the FPB 's poor C2 and lack of ability 
to conduct coordinated operations in the past. 
Today's advanced COTS C2 technology 
could perhaps drastically increase the FPB threat. 
With effective C2 these third-world nation's FPBs 
could mount coordinated attacks that could saturate 
the SAG's defenses. 
The FPB' s small size and high speed 
combine to complicate U.S. intelligence gathering. 
In addition, U.S. Naval combatants are not 
optimized to track and target the FPBs, nor can 
they still assume the dominant tactical advantage 
inherent with superior C2. Still employing forces 
specifically designed for blue water warfare, the 
U.S. Navy is caught in the middle of this shifting 
paradigm and appears slow to react to the fast 
patrol boat (FPB) threat in the littorals. 
3 Research Questions 
FPBs already pose speed and stealth advantages 
over most naval combatants. The main research 
question is the effect that coordinated saturati~n 
attacks by FPBs, employing advanced C2, will 
have on an engagement with U. S. SAGs 
operating in the littoral seas. Also of interest are 
the effects of increased workload and incomplete 
intelligence on U.S. operations, both of which 
accompany the presence of FPBs in an operating 
area, and their interactions with the main effect. 
4 Approach 
A three factor experiment was constructed 
involving human decision makers. All factors 
were presented at two levels, high and low, 
resulting in a two cubed factorial experiment. The 
experiment was designed and executed on the 
Battle Management Assessment System and Raid 
Originator Bogie Ingress wargame, more 
commonly called Batman and Robin (B&R) 
[Federico, et al. , 1991]. Eight different scenarios 
were generated on Robin, the scenario generation 
capability of B&R, to present all combinations of 
levels and factors. Each scenario was then 
administered to NPS students on Batman, the 
executable portion of B&R, for a total of 128 trials. 
The geographic location of each scenario was 
identical: the Persian Gulf, between the Straits of 
Hormuz and Bahrain. Red forces were comprised 
of nine FPBs per scenario. A three combatant 
U.S . Navy SAG, including five organic 
helicopters, constituted Blue forces for each 
scenario. The three design variables or factors 
were C2 Coordination, W okload, and Information 
Completeness. 
4.1 FPB C2 
The level of coordination or C2 used by the FPBs 
during an attack on the SAG is the primary factor 
and central area of interest in this experiment and 
the original impetus for the experiment. The 
analysis, presented later will focus on this factor. 
Two levels of FPBs C2 were achieved by varying 
their tactical coordination between high and low. 
High coordination was modeled by three 
concurrent waves of attacks by the FPBs. For this 
case seven of the nine FPBs were in restricted 
emission control (EMCON) status with the 
remaining two in an unrestricted EMCON status. 
It was assumed that the coordinated attackers 
would share information about the enemy, the 
U.S. SAG in this case, and thus require fewer 
emissions. Low coordination was modeled by 
sequential attacks of FPBs with only two of the 
nine FPBs in an EMCON status and the remainino . 0 
seven emitting. 
The two other factors in the experiment are 
workload and information completeness. While 
each was analyzed, the primary focus of the 
analysis will be on their interaction with the main 
effect, C2. 
4.2 Workload 
It is conceivable that third-world countries 
employing FPBs with COTS C2 could also use 
their advanced C2 to influence the level of non-
hostile or neutral contacts within Blue's 
battlespace. For example a third world nation 
could orchestrate a massing of own or allied 
country non-hostile shipping near the SAG in 
conjunction with an FPB attack. This increased 
workload on Blue could have a significant impact 
on SAG combat performance. High workload 
scenarios contained 24 neutral ships in the 
operating area. These are in addition to the nine 
hostile FPBs. Low workload scenarios contained 
nine neutral ships in addition to the nine hostile 
FPBs. 
4.3 Information Completeness 
One way to counter the advantage gained by the 
FPBs use of COTS C2 is to increase the U.S. 
intelligence collecting capabilities. either through 
acquisition of new systems, or more likely, 
through repriortization of existing U.S. Navy and 
national intelligence assets. Two levels of 
intelligence, called information completeness, were 
used in the experiment, by providing the subjects 
with a maritime intelligence message at the 
beginning of each scenario. This message 
contained a high or low level of information 
completeness. High information completeness was 
represented by providing subjects the ratio of 
hostile ships in each threat sector to the total 
number of ships in the threat sector. For low 
information completeness, only the total number of 
ships per threat sector was given. 
5 Anticipated Results 
The hypothesized results were that the Blue SAG 
would perform better when the following occurred: 
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Incoming FPB attacks were uncoordinated 
(sequential) vice coordinated (concurrent); the 
ship's combat team was experiencing low 
workload conditions; and information or 
intelligence reports were more complete. 
6 Experimental Design 
The complexity of the scenarios for this 
experiment was limited due to time constraints and 
the varied backgrounds and limited operational 
experience of the subjects. Blue Force resources 
were initialized in the same manner for every 
scenario and for every subject. Otherwise, there 
was risk that subjects with operational experience 
would rely on their expert knowledge to position 
their forces in an advantageous manner based on 
platform capabilities. In addition, certain 
artificialities were accepted in the interest of 
practicality and usability. For instance, the 
wargarne was run at a speed of 4: 1 (i.e., 4 seconds 
of real time = 1 second of simulation time). 
Therefore a standard 152 minute scenario was 
completed in 38 minutes of real time. All scenarios 
were similar in construction except to allow for the 
systematic introduction of all levels of all factors. 
Scenarios were constructed to appear different to 
the subjects (without affecting essential traits). 
This diminished the chance of subjects relying on 
prior scenario knowledge to "game" the scenario 
instead of making decisions based on current 
scenario developments. 
6.1 Physical Setup 
B&R was obtained from the creator of the 
wargame, Dr. Pat-Anthony Federico at the Naval 
Personnel Research and Development Center, San 
Diego. It is written in "C" programming language. 
B&R was installed onto five Sun Sparc-20 
stations in the NPS' Systems Technology Lab. All 
scenarios were created in Robin on one Spare 
station and ported to the other four to ensure 
standardization. The subjects executed each 
scenario independently of the other subjects. The 
experiment was conducted m a controlled 
environment. 
6.2 Subjects 
Sixteen subjects participated in the experiment. 
This section discusses demographic information on 
the subjects and how the subjects were trained for 
and participated in the trials 
6.2.1 Demographic Information 
Of the 16 subjects, all were student officers 
assigned to NPS. Eight were USN, five were 
USMC, two were USAF, and one was USA. Six 
of the eight naval officers were designated Surface 
Warfare Officers (SWOs) and were thought to have 
the highest degree of expert domain knowledge 
based on the scenarios. Years of service ranged 
from 5-16 years. 
A demographic questionnaire was also 
completed by each subject during the overview 
brief. The subjects were asked to subjectively rate 
their level of proficiency in each of the following 
areas on a scale from one (poor) to ten (expert). 
Detailed analysis of the demographic data was not 
attempted nor was an attempt made to evaluate their 
impact on the hypotheses or interactions. This is 
an area for further work. The demographic data 
elements are described below. 
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6.2.1.1 Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) 
Symbology/Nomenclature 
Proficiency with NTDS symbology was 
asked because the symbology used in B&R is very 
similar to NTDS symbology. It was presumed that 
familiarity with similar symbology would give a 
subject an advantage in adjusting to the wargame. 
As expected, the range of responses to this question 
were bimodal with ten of the sixteen subjects evenly 
split between the top end of the scale and the bottom 
end with naval officers dominating the high mode. 
6.2.1.2 Simulations and Wargames 
Experience with wargames could influence a 
subject's performance. The responses to the 
question regarding wargame experience was 
normally distributed. 
6.2.1.3 Tactical Action Officer (TAO) 
The TAO plays a key role in defending the 
SAG against an FPB attack and launching the 
counter-attack. Fifty percent of the subjects had no 
TAO experience. 
6.2.1.4 Computer Proficiency 
Finally, the data pertaining to the level of 
computer proficiency was collected. 
6.2.2 Subject Training and Trials 
All subjects were given a 50 minute 
overview brief of SAG tactics, platforms, sensors, 
weapons performance parameters, weapon status, 
weapon posture meanings, threats, and B&R rules. 
Each subject was given two practice trials followed 
by the eight experimental trials in which data was 
collected. During the practice trials, subjects 
received one-on-one instruction on playing B&R 
from trained proctors. All trials were completed 
during a ten day period. Subjects were limited to 
three trials per day. 
6.3 Statistical Design of the Experiment 
The experiment was counter-balanced to negate the 
learning effect. The two-cubed was implemented 
using eight unique scenarios. Using 16 subjects 
and a complete randomized block design with 2 
replications yielded an 8x16 output matrix. To 
construct the design matrix the scenario type, order 
of scenario presentation, and subject's assignment 
to a scenario presentation were all randomized. 
7. Data Collection Plan 
This section discusses the performance measures 
that were automatically generated by B&R and 
used to test the hypotheses, and how the data were 
prepared for statistical analysis. 
7.1 Measures 
B&R's automatic data collection feature collected 
81 performance measures (PMs) or dependent 
variables for each trial. The 81 PMs are divided 
into two broad categories: Blue Forces' 
performance vs. Red Forces and Red Forces' 
performance vs. Blue Forces. Each of these two 
broad categories is further divided into 3 sub-
categories: air forces vs. surface, surface forces vs. 
surface, and combined air/surface forces vs. 
surface. Only 10 PMs were applicable to this 
experiment. The first five PMs measure Blue 
Forces' performance. The second five measure 
Red Forces' performance. The PM's used are 
defined below. The first five measure Blue's 
performance against Red. The second five 
measure Red's performance against Blue. 
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1. BAFP 1: FPBs detected by Blue Air(%). 
2. BAFP 2: Ave. range (measured from 
nearest Blue force ship) at which FPBs were 
first detected by Blue Air (nm). 
3. BSP 3: FPB's destroyed by Blue Surface 
(%). 
4. BSP 4: Ave. range (measured from nearest 
Blue force ship) at which FPBs were destroyed 
by Blue Surface (nm.). 
5. BAFP 12: Number of TAO weapon 
assignments (count).• 
6. A 1: Blue Air detected by the FPBs (%). 
7. S 1: Blue Surface detected by the FPBs 
(%). 
8. A 2: Average range (measured from nearest 
FPB) at which Blue Air was first detected by 
the FPBs (nm.). 
9. S 2: Average range (measured from nearest 
FPB) at which Blue Surface was first detected 
by the FPBs (nm.). 
JO. A 3: Blue Air destroyed by the FPBs (%). 
7.2 Data Preparation 
B&R automatically calculates elemental values and 
statistics for the PMs. However hardware and 
software limitations prohibited the automatic 
transfer of information to a data file for further 
analysis. Therefore the data files were manually 
constructed. At the end of each trial B&R 
displayed the PMs on the display screen. Each 
subject transferred their performance data set from 
the monitor to the PM data collection sheet. The 
data were then manually entered into a spreadsheet. 
Before any manipulations were performed, 
• Blue forces had to utilize the TAO function in order to fire 
their weapons and engage Red forces. 
the data were put through a rigorous quality control 
process to check for input errors. Next, data 
reduction was performed and the data ported from 
spreadsheet into a statistical package (Mini tab) for 
statistical analysis. The data were then re-checked 
for errors. 
7 .3 Data Coding Scheme 
For post data processing purposes, each scenario 
was uniquely described by the level, high or low, 
for each of the three factors: Information 
Completeness (I), Work Load (L), and FPB C2 
(C). This information was coded as a three digit 
number with each digit limited to a '2' (high) or a 
'1' (low). All the data entered from each PM data 
collection sheet into the spreadsheet was indexed 
by this three digit scenario code which identified 
one of the eight scenario types from which it was 
derived. For example, the scenario with I, L, and 
C at the high level is coded 222. The scenario with 
all factors at the low level is coded 111. We 
anticipated scenario 211 (high information, low 
work load, low FPB coordination) would produce 
the best results for Blue forces 
8 Analysis Plan 
The data analysis plan includes frequency plots to 
obtain a pictorial representation of the 128 data 
points per PM (16 subjects x 8 scenarios). This 
established an initial feel for the data and provided 
insight for further detailed analysis. The shape of 
some of these plots made our initial assumption of 
normality for these data questionable. Next, box 
plots were used to examine the three factors' 
individual impacts on the PMs. After a preliminary 
understanding of the data were obtained, we tested 
the effects on all PMs simultaneously using three 
factor MANOV A Since residual analysis showed 
that not all PMs appeared normal, we used 
parametric and non-parametric ANOV A and 
interaction plots to further assess the data. A 
significance level of a = 0.05 was used to test all 
null hypotheses. 
9 Hypothesis Results 
All three factors and three of their interactions 
produced significant effects, although not for all 
PMs. All significant effects are described below. 
9.1 Main Effects 
All three factors produced significant effects and 
are described below with their associated PMs. 
9.1.1 FPB C2 
FPB C2 had a significant impact on seven 
PMs: 
• The percentage of FPBs detected by Blue 
Air (BAFP ]), p = .000, 90.1% detected when 
FPBs were coordinated, and 98.1% detected 
when FPBs were uncoordinated; 
• The average range of detection of the FPBs 
(BAFP 2), p = .000, 76.0 nm when FPBs were 
coordinated, and 66.6 nm when FPBs were 
uncoordinated; 
541 
• The percentage of FPBs destroyed by Blue 
Surface (BSP3), p = .000, 65.5% destroyed 
when FPBs were coordinated, and 84.9% 
destroyed when FPBs were uncoordinated; 
• The average range at which the FPBs were 
destroyed by Blue Surface (BSP 4), p = 
.002,32.8 nm when FPBs were coordinated, 
and 27.5 nm when FPBs were uncoordinated; 
• The number of TAO weapon assignments 
(BAFP), p = .000, 17.0 assignments when 
FPBs were coordinated, and 22.3 assignments 
when FPBs were uncoordinated; 
• The percentage of Blue Air detected by the 
FPBs (A 1), p = .012, 93.9% detected when 
FPBs were coordinated, and 97.9% detected 
when FPBs were uncoordinated; and 
• The percentage of Blue Surface detected by 
the FPBs (S 1 ), p = .003, 19.3% detected when 
FPBs were coordinated, and 27.1% detected 
when FPBs were uncoordinated. 
When the FPBs had high C2, fewer were 
detected, however, of those detected the range of 
detection was greater. Similarly, when the FPBs 
had high C2 fewer were destroyed, but those that 
were destroyed were done so at a greater range. It 
only makes sense that if they were not detected 
they could not be killed, and if they were detected 
further out, that they would be killed further out. 
But why would fewer be detected and those 
detected be detected at greater range? The answer 
to this is inherent in the scenario design and is two 
fold. When the FPBs had high C2, they conducted 
a coordinated (concurrent waves vice sequential) 
attack with seven of the nine FPBs in EMCON. 
Without the FPBs radiating they were more 
difficult to detect, but due to their organization Blue 
had more time to prepare and to deploy forces. 
Fewer TAO assignments were made when 
the FPBs had high C2. This explains why fewer 
FPBs were destroyed when C2 was high. 
Analyzing the operations from the FPBs 
perspective reveals that the FPBs detected fewer 
Blue Air and Surface platforms when they had high 
C2. This is a direct result and a potential 
disadvantage of the high C2 (stealth) attack. 
9.1.2 Workload 
Workload had a significant impact on two 
PMs: 
• The average range of detection (BAFP 2), p 
=.001, 69.6 nm when blue workload was high, 
and 73.0 nm when blue workload was low; and 
• The average range at which the FPBs were 
destroyed (BSP 4), p = .001, 27.4 nm when 
blue workload was high, and 32.9 nm when 
blue workload was low. 
In both cases, performance was adversely 
affected (range decreases) when workload 
increased. 
9.1.3 Information Completeness 
Information completeness had a significant 
impact on only on PM: 
• The average range at which the FPBs were 
destroyed by Blue Surface (BSP 4), p = .047, 
31.8 nm when information was complete, and 
28.5 nm when information was incomplete. 
With complete information Blue Forces 
were able to kill the enemy over 3 nm further out 
than with incomplete information. 
9.2 Interactions 
Three interactions produced significant effects and 
are described below. 
9.2.1 Information Completeness and FPB C2 
The combined effects of Information 
Completeness and FPB C2 had a significant impact 
on the mean range at which the FPBs were 
destroyed by Blue Surface (BSP 4), p = .011. 
When FPBs were conducting 
uncoordinated attacks (low C2), information 
completeness has no effect. But when the FPBs 
use coordinated attacks (high C2), the FPBs are 
destroyed at much greater range when Blue has 
complete information, 36.5 nm, than when Blue 
has incomplete information, 29 .0 nm. 
9.2.2 Workload and FPB C2 
The combined effects of Work Load and 
FPB C2 had a significant impact on the average 
range at which Blue Air was first detected (A 2), 
even though neither taken alone is significant. 
Additional analysis does not yet help explain why 
the FPBs would have detected Blue Air further out 
with high C2: p = .000, 46.14 nm when C2 high, 
and 44.56 nm when C2 low. 
9.2.3 Information Completeness, Work Load, 
and FPB C2 
The combined effects of Information 
Completeness, Work Load, and FPB C2 had a 
significant impact on the average range of detection 
of the FPBs (BAFP 2) although no attempt is made 
in this preliminary analysis to interpret this 
interaction. 
9.3 Operational Interpretation 
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Five Blue helicopters scouting a geographically 
constrained littoral region probably reduced the 
importance of judicious resource allocation and 
thus lessened the effect of whether Blue had 
Complete or Incomplete Information. In essence, 
the subjects had nearly total radar coverage 
provided by the helicopters regardless of where 
they directed them. 
The impact of FPB C2 changing levels registered 
in more dependent variables than any other factor. 
Probable causes include: 1.) FPBs were in 
EMCON when C2 was high which greatly effected 
there ability to see and be seen. and 2.) When 
FPB C2 was high their tactics differed significantly 
than when their C2 was low. In the former case, 
the FPBs converged on Blue in three concentric 
circles. The attack was concurrent in three waves. 
In the latter case, the attack was more sequential 
and random. The net result might be that even 
though Blue was able to carry out a more 
methodical and deliberate counterattack when the 
FPBs had high C2, they could not detect as many 
and therefore could not kill as many. 
10 Recommendations 
The experiment could be improved by more 
realistically setting the levels of information 
completeness and workload. Reducing the number 
of helicopters would help accomplish the former 
for reasons stated above. Workload could be varied 
between high and low based on real world 
maximum and minimum shipping levels in the 
Persian Gulf to ensure applicability to present day 
operations. The FPB threat is an emerging one, so 
it will be more difficult to find real world data on 
which to model FPB C2 and tactics, but this aspect 
of the study should be pursued. 
The easiest way to extend this analysis is to 
segregate subjects by warfare specialty or service 
and then analyze the data accordingly. Other ways 
include: replicating the experiment on another 
simulation system to show the affects of B&R 
artifacts, using different scenarios to neutralize 
scenario effects, or investigating different factors 
or different levels of studied factors. 
The analysis of the data collected from this 
experiment is ongoing. It is possible that different 
conclusions may be reached when more detailed 
analysis is completed. 
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